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General equilibrium, coordination and 
 multiplicity on spot markets.  
 
by Roger Guesnerie1 
Collège de France et Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques. 
 
Résumé : Ce texte constitue une version anglaise légèrement révisée d’un article paru dans 
la “Revue d’Economie Politique” 112 (5) sept-oct 2002. Il passe en revue des travaux 
récents concernant la coordination des anticipations dans les modèles d’équilibre général de 
la tradition walrassienne. Il évoque de façon cursive les problèmes de multiplicité de 
l’équilibre général inter-temporel dans les modèles à horizon infini et les questions 
d’apprentissage « divinatoire » de l’équilibre.  Il traite plus systématiquement des 
difficultés créées par la multiplicité des équilibres au comptant dans les modèles à horizon 
fini et des relations entre coordination et incomplétude.   
Equilibre général, coordination, multiplicité. 
 
Abstract : This is a slightly revised English version of a paper published in the “Revue 
d’Economie Politique” 112 (5) sept-oct 2002. The text reviews recent work on 
expectational coordination in general equilibrium models of the Walrasian tradition. It 
evokes briefly the multiplicity questions associated with infinite horizon models and the 
issues associated with “eductive learning”. It examines in a more systematic way the 
coordination difficulties that would arise in finite horizon models with spot multiplicity and 
discusses the relationship between coordination and incompleteness.  
General equilibrium models, coordination, multiplicity. 
JEL : D5,E3 
 
 
                                                     
1 This is a text to appear in “Beliefs, Knowledge and Economics” Eward Edgar.  I thank the  
translator for careful work.   
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1 Introduction 
 
Before embarking into our main argument, we should point out that any economic or social 
theory, based on the assumption that individuals enjoy a degree of autonomy, must explain 
both their motivation and their cognitive representations of the world. Economic theory 
often postulates the rationality of motives, to which it associates preferences described 
through utility functions. Representations or beliefs in this context take the form of 
expectations, a functional reduction that comes naturally into general equilibrium theory, 
the subject to which this contribution is mainly devoted. 
The world of static general equilibrium may be imaginary but it is a world whose 
understanding has proved surprisingly instructive in deciphering the complexity of 
interactions between real markets. In this world, the only information affecting agents’s 
decisions, apart from any private information they may have, is embodied in equilibrium 
prices, supposing that  the mechanisms leading to their realisation are in place.  In a 
sequential context, the relevant beliefs concern  future prices. Such beliefs on future prices 
are captured in formal models by estimates in the form of probabilistic expectations. In this 
context, a reflection on beliefs is therefore tantamount to a reflection on price expectations. 
The objective of this introductory article is not to present an exhaustive 
retrospective of the history of research on expectations in Walrasian general equilibrium 
models. While attempting to sketch out a general overview, what follows touches upon on 
certain aspects of this history, focussing on finite horizon general equilibrium models and 
stressing the difficulties associated with the multiplicity that can affect spot market 
equilibria. These aspects of the work on expectations in general equilibrium models are not 
amongst the best known in economics but, I believe, are of unquestionable relevance to 
both economic theory and economic history. 
Section 2 of this paper presents the inter-temporal version, à la Radner, of the 
Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model; it discusses  the role that the related concepts of 
completeness and of  ‘rationality of expectations’ have for allocative efficiency. In this 
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context, section 3 introduces the at times contradictory but often complementary positions 
taken by research on expectations (subsection 3-1),  then goes on to evoke the problem of 
inter-temporal equilibrium multiplicity in infinite horizon models (subsection 3-2).; 
particularly in models that placed the analysis of expectations at centre stage (overlapping 
generation models) in Section 4 describes the problems of expectation coordination that 
follows from  the possibility of multiple ‘spot’ equilibria over time, as discussed in 
subsection 4-1. Attention is then turned to the analysis of stochastic equilibria by focussing 
on the effects of ex-ante and ex-post insurance (subsection 4-2) and the possible roles of 
redundant assets (subsection 4-3). Section 5 returns to the theme of uniqueness versus spot 
multiplicity (section 5-1) and introduces incompleteness into the analysis. In section 6, in 
order to get a quick glimpse of the rest of the panorama, the focus moves from multiplicity 
to learning and particularly to eductive learning which emphasises the ‘cognitive’ stability 
of expectations, setting aside the problem of multiplicity. 
 
 
2 From the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium to the equilibrium of 
plans, prices and price expectations 
  
Let us start from a retrospective on the emergence of the theme  of expectations and more 
specifically of rational expectations in general equilibrium theory after the 1970s. 
 
 
2.1 The Arrow-Debreu model 
 
The mathematical economics of the 1950s and 1960s transformed the Walrasian general 
equilibrium model into the Arrow-Debreu model. There is little point in emphasizing the 
merits of this work in this context. The rigour and the greater generality of the argument in 
particular allow an at times considerable extension of the interpretations. By distinguishing 
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goods by date or even by the state of nature in which they become available, this formally 
static theory takes both time and uncertainty into account. 
An Arrow-Debreu inter-temporal equilibrium specifies prices for dated goods: these 
are  discounted prices and the evolution of the prices of a physical good over time gives rise 
to interest rates that are specific to this good. In this model, the prices are announced and 
the decisions to exchange and consume are taken at the beginning of time,  even if 
transactions only take place at the moment in which the goods become available.  
 In order to illustrate the model, in what follows I shall examine an exchange 
economy with two goods in each period and two types of agents (to simplify, I assume that 
each type is constituted by a continuum of identical infinitesimal agents whose total mass 
comes to 1/2, so that everything takes place as if there were two representative agents). I 
shall at times refer to this model as the 2x2x2 model.1 The reader will note that this simple 
economy has the advantage that it can be graphically represented within an Edgeworth box. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The 2x2x2 model 
 
 
The markets for dated future goods are forward markets and the Arrow-Debreu 
model therefore describes a system in which, in traditional language, spot markets for 
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goods available today (in period 1 for the two-period model) coexist with forward markets 
for each of the goods available tomorrow. 
 
2.2 The sequential model 
 
We can substitute  a purely sequential organisation to the type of forward market 
organisation just introduced. Now goods are only negotiated on spot markets, in other 
words, when they become available; the only forward markets - where a trade and the 
actual realisation of the transaction occur at different dates - are financial markets. In the 
simple 2x2x2 model used to illustrate the argument, during the first period, the sequential 
organisation means spot markets for available goods coexist with a financial market that 
operates as a medium of exchange between income (or the numeraire) in period one and 
income (or the numeraire) in period two. In period two, there exist only spot markets where 
the available goods are exchanged. 
 We can formalise the competitive equilibrium of the sequential organisation in a 
variety of ways. In the logic of the old temporary equilibrium, expectations are treated, 
similarly to preferences, as exogenous. Preferences can be made endogenous by using 
rational expectations: in the 2x2x2 model this would consist in making them perfect in the 
sense of assuming perfect foresight. 
 This is exactly what the concept of equilibrium of prices, plans and price 
expectations (EPPPE) proposed by Radner (1972) does in this context.2 
 The new formalisation recognises the sequential character of the exchanges so that 
in this sense it appears to be more ‘realistic’ than the Arrow-Debreu story. 
 The idea of the superiority of realism would however be more  convincing if it were 
supported by a theory explaining the formation of markets. Outlining such a theory goes 
beyond the scope of this article, even though, as we shall see later on, a complete answer to 
the issues that will be raised, would require a more satisfactory analysis of the conditions 
for and obstacles to the creation of markets.  
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2.3 Efficiency and the sequential organisation of exchange 
 
In the framework we have just outlined, the allocations of the forward market model are 
identical to those of the spot market, as long as the system of financial markets is 
sufficiently ‘deep’. In the 2x2x2 model the proof of the identity of the Arrow-Debreu and 
Radner equilibrium allocations is particularly simple. However, the property is more 
general.  As long as markets are essentially complete in the Hahn (1973) sense, as Arrow 
(1953) had suggested and as Guesnerie and Jaffray (1974) proved quite generally in a 
context combining both time and uncertainty, the equilibrium allocations of the two finite 
horizon models coincide.3 
 The sequential organization of exchange actually allows the emergence of an 
Arrow-Debreu (Pareto-optimal) equilibrium: Muth’s rational expectations hypothesis, the 
fact that agents do not make systematic errors in predicting the future state of the economy, 
which in this context leads to a Radner type EPPPE, is in some ways the missing link 
between the static competition model and the dynamic competition model. Once again, we 
find rational expectations going hand in hand with an optimistic vision of the functioning of 
markets, as it was already the case when the  rational expectations hypothesis was 
introduced into monetary macroeconomics.  
We should of course emphasise the conditions under which the above report is true. 
Intuitively, the rationality of expectations, which guarantees the absence of forecast errors 
in the sense adopted by the EPPPE should be   a necessary condition for efficient 
allocation. It is a sufficient condition only when combined with the assumption that 
markets are essentially complete. 
The required ‘depth’ of the financial markets is easy to analyse in the context of the 
2x2x2 model: a securities market in period one is sufficient. This can be a lot more difficult 
to assess in other contexts: such an assessment inevitably raises the issue of 
“incompleteness”,  the subject of a new chapter in general equilibrium research in the 
1980s.  
Moreover, the coordination of expectations inherent in an EPPPE equilibrium, 
which is ‘perfect’, because the expectations are identical and accurate, raises issues relating 
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to the realisation of equilibrium that are a lot more delicate than may at first appear. It is to 
these that we shall now turn. 
 
 
3 The coordination of expectations in EPPPE 
 
3.1 Foreword 
 
The first difficulty reflects the most obvious form of the multiplicity problem. Let 
us imagine that there are many intertemporal Arrow-Debreu equilibria and therefore many 
sequential PPPE equilibria. The assumption of perfect foresight and rational expectations 
does not lead to a unique prediction. Neither the external observer, nor the model’s agents 
can get a univocal idea of the evolution of the economy by simply calculating the 
equilibrium. 
 The second difficulty is still related to multiplicity but in a less direct way. Let us 
suppose that only one intertemporal Arrow-Debreu equilibrium exists and, therefore, that 
there is only one sequential PPPE equilibrium. This sequential equilibrium defines a vector 
of equilibrium prices in each set of spot markets. But this vector of equilibrium prices is not 
necessarily, and generally has no reason to be, the only vector of spot equilibrium prices! 
There may well be ‘spot’ multiplicity along the intertemporal path of the (unique) 
equilibrium. Figure 2 illustrates the phenomenon in the case of a 2x2x2 model. The arrow 
shows the change in initial endowments associated with the exchange of numeraire-
denominated securities during the first period. The unique intertemporal equilibrium 
consists in two price vectors, app 21, . However, if we take the security transactions 
(equilibrium transactions) into account, there are three spot equilibrium vectors cba ppp 222 ,,  
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Figure 2 : Spot multiplicity, second period. The equilibrium price vectors are cba ppp 222 ,, , 
(budget lines from the left to the right) 
 
The third difficulty is not related to multiplicity: how can we ensure that agents will 
coordinate along the spot equilibrium price vector, even when this happens to be unique? 
Let us try to make a certain number of polar conditions on coordination more 
explicit in order to place the problems that we have just informally mentioned into a better-
defined perspective. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The intertemporal ‘Scarf agency’ 
 
Assume the information on preferences and allocations is public. If so, a control agency 
endowed with adequate computational capabilities, can calculate the Arrow-Debreu 
equilibrium, deduce the PPPE equilibria, choose one (if there is more than one) and 
announce the prices to the markets in each period. These announcements, whether they 
refer to effective prices or to price forecasts, will be self-fulfilling. In other words, they will 
become true if they are believed. According to this interpretation, all the coordination 
difficulties will be resolved due to the activity of a central agency – which is informed and 
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endowed with adequate and credible computational capabilities – and not thanks to the 
cognitive activity of the agents. We refer to an intertemporal Scarf agency rather than to an 
intertemporal Walrasian auctioneer in order to emphasise the fact that the agency is 
endowed with computational and information gathering capabilities that exceed those that 
Walras attributed to his auctioneer.4 
 
Hypothesis 2: ‘Common knowledge’ equilibrium coordination 
 
Let us imagine that this central coordination agency no longer exists, but that all the 
information on endowments and preferences is public and therefore accessible to each 
agent, who, moreover, is endowed with infinite computational capabilities. Let us also 
imagine that every agent knows that each coordinates on a specific equilibrium, or that 
coordination on a particular equilibrium is common knowledge. This strong cognitive 
hypothesis ensures, in the case in which the intertemporal equilibrium is unique, that the 
agents will compute it and coordinate around it. However, in the case of multiple equilibria, 
a further intervention is necessary, in other words, there needs to be at least a public signal 
highlighting one of the equilibria. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Potential common knowledge of the equilibrium coordination with 
independent ‘Scarf agencies’ 
 
Although the agents are potentially capable of computing the equilibria, the calculations 
and announcements are made by independent agencies acting sequentially. Thus, in the 
2x2x2 model, the second period equilibrium prices will be announced by an agency whose 
rules of operation are known, but which is not necessarily synchronized with the agency 
operating in period one. The prices announced in the second period will of course take into 
account the transactions carried out in the first period. In line with the previous example, 
the agency in the second period will have three possible a priori choices, cba ppp 222 ,, . 
Without being too precise at this stage as to the underlying formal model, let us say that the 
independence of the second period agency means the first period agency is unable to make 
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unique predictions on the prices of the second period. Despite this fact, the agents are 
assumed to anticipate prices correctly. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Common knowledge of rationality 
 
In this hypothesis, the equilibrium in the first period depends on the activity of an agency 
whose operation does not interfere with the process of agents’ expectations formation. The 
agents’ forecast is the result of a collective, though private, cognitive activity which rests 
on two hypotheses, a sufficient knowledge (in the sense of common knowledge) of 
rationality, preferences and endowments of the other agents and the expectation that the 
operations carried out in financial markets, the second period spot equilibrium,5 will be 
competitive. 
 
This list of possibilities, which has been cursorily reviewed and whose description remains 
deliberately informal, does not exhaust all the possibilities. However, it has the advantage 
of setting out the limits of this exposition (essentially the research based on Hypothesis 3 
and set out in sections 4 and 5), while also briefly presenting the difficulties associated with 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, the subject of what follows, and those relating to Hypothesis 4, 
discussed in section 6. 
 
3.2 A parenthesis: coordination problems due to intertemporal 
equilibrium multiplicity 
 
A standard finite horizon general equilibrium model with complete markets can have many 
PPPE intertemporal equilibria. This multiplicity raises a coordination problem that an 
intertemporal Scarf agency as outlined in Hypothesis 1 could resolve, but which destroys 
the predictive ability associated with the common knowledge of equilibrium coordination 
associated with Hypothesis 2. A move to infinite horizon models would exacerbate the 
coordination difficulties due to intertemporal multiplicity. Without delving too much into 
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the details of the literature that has focused on this problem, let us review some of the most 
pertinent results for our purposes in order to place this text into a wider perspective. 
 Difficulties do not mainly originate from  the infinite horizon hypothesis (though 
we should point out that the difficulties examined in the following paragraphs increase with 
the length of the horizon and, in a way, do so more than proportionally), but from the 
passage from a finite to an infinite number of agents.6 This move calls into question both 
the efficiency of the PPPE inter-temporal competitive equilibrium and its ‘determinacy’, in 
other words the fact that the equilibria are generally finite and topologically ‘isolated’. 
These two phenomena can be easily observed in the simple overlapping generation models 
put forward by Allais and Samuelson (Allais 1947, Samuelson 1958). In the model without 
money, where agents have (too) poor endowments when they are ‘old’, autarchy becomes 
an inefficient equilibrium. In the model with money, which can be viewed either as a 
bubble or a kind of coordinated sequence of lump-sum transfers, we know that the 
stationary monetary equilibrium can be indeterminate: in that case there is a continuum of 
perfect forecast equilibria which converge towards this stationary equilibrium as time tends 
to infinity. Each of these phenomena (indeterminacy, inefficiency) is robust, as is clearly 
shown in a context of intermediate generality ( n  goods, one step forward-looking, memory 
1) by the work of Kehoe and Levine (1985). 
 Indeterminacy poses a problem of coordination of expectations that is a lot more 
complicated than that posed by finite horizon intertemporal multiplicity. And this is not the 
only problem: in the neighbourhood of a given equilibrium (which is stationary and 
deterministic in the overlapping generations model referred to earlier) there can be infinite 
neighbouring equilibria (which are not stationary but are deterministic in the same 
example). Also,  sunspot equilibria in the sense of Cass and Shell (1983), which are regular 
in the sense of being stationary, can arise founded on extrinsic uncertainty. For example, in 
an overlapping generations model with money, stationary sunspot equilibria (Azariadis 
1981, Azariadis and Guesnerie 1982) exist once the deterministic stationary equilibrium is 
‘indeterminate’. All these equilibria are of course rational expectations equilibria or 
equilibria that are based on perfectly indexed forecasts on the sunspots (note the semantic 
ambiguity). De facto, these equilibria are stochastic quasi-cycles and coexist with solutions 
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of another class, the deterministic cycles à la Grandmont (1985).7 Although the structure of 
the set of rational expectations equilibria, in particular the so-called sunspot equilibria, in 
finite horizon models is not fully elucidated except in the one-dimensional , one step 
forward looking  overlapping generations model (see Grandmont 1989, Chiappori and 
Guesnerie 1991, Guesnerie and Woodford 1992, Guesnerie 2001a), the potential generality 
of the phenomena outlined here is not questionable and is largely illustrated by existing 
research. 
 
4. Spot multiplicity and coordination 
 
Let us revert to our more limited finite horizon outlook and go back to Figure 2 which 
provides a graphic representation of a case of spot market equilibrium multiplicity. 
 Again, the unique intertemporal equilibrium consists in two price vectors, app 21, . 
However, taking into account the securities trades (equilibrium trades) there are three spot 
equilibrium vectors, cba ppp 222 ,, . 
 How should we translate the idea that coordination does not result from a perfectly 
centralized mechanism and that the selection of the spot equilibrium is carried out by an 
independent agency? 
 
4.1 On the operation of the independent agency 
 
To start with, we can imagine that the agency makes use of a deterministic choice 
mechanism, a mechanism that the logic of independent agencies suggests should depend on 
nothing else but the characteristics of the second period ‘problem’, for example the vector 
of initial endowments modified by the realisation of trades associated with the securities 
market (the starting point of the budget lines on Figure 1 and Figure 2).   
However, a greater difficulty appears here: it is well known that the rule that has 
just been referred to, i.e. that the spot market equilibrium price is a function of the 
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endowments (modified by previous financial commitments), cannot be continuous if there 
are multiple equilibria in the domain of initial endowments under consideration.8 This 
remark suggests that the independent functioning of tomorrow’s market agency (in the 
2x2x2 model) might be incompatible (for certain configurations of the intertemporal 
economy) with the existence of an equilibrium. This conjecture is not as mysterious as it 
might appear at first sight. If the 2x2x2 model illustrated here has only a single 
intertemporal equilibrium and if the rule of the independent coordination agency specifies 
that Bpp 22 =  for the configuration of initial endowments W ′ , then there is no (perfect 
foresight) equilibrium that is compatible with the choice of the agency. 
Another way we could try to compensate for the difficulty that arises due to the 
independence of the second period Scarf agency, would consist in allowing for complete 
insurance against the uncertainty of the announcement of a further equilibrium. For 
example, it is tempting to see the choice of the second period coordinator in our 2x2x2 
model as the operation of a sunspot that takes  the three values r, g and v and to make the 
assumption that the signal is not only observable but also verifiable and contractible. An 
insurance market would then allow income exchanges, arising from previous trades on 
contingent securities, that would precede the choice of equilibrium. But if all contingent 
securities exist, the market is complete and the Pareto optimal equilibrium vis-à-vis the set 
of random (and not only deterministic) allocations coincides, in a convex economy,  with 
the initial equilibrium. This is the Cass and Shell (1983) ‘ineffectivity” theorem. For 
example in our 2x2x2 model, the new equilibrium allocations with the new securities 
coincide with the initial equilibrium allocations. Still, have we solved our problem? No, the 
new securities are not exchanged at equilibrium and, paradoxically in view of our objective, 
the number of spot equilibria remains unchanged. We have not advanced by an iota towards 
the solution of the multiplicity problem. The ineffectivity theorem, contrary to what a 
superficial reading might suggest, does not imply that the problem of multiplicity can be 
resolved by an insurance that proceeds ex-ante to the choice of the spot equilibrium. 
What lessons can we learn from this first analysis? That in a ‘complex’ sequential 
market the deus ex machina of coordination on the unique intertemporal equilibrium 
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operates with less force. Short of coordinating the coordinators (the independent agencies 
in this case) the emergence of a fully coordinated and efficient equilibrium is problematic. 
It would appear inevitable, under the independence hypothesis we envisage, to 
make the choice of the agency random in the case of spot multiplicity. It would then be 
described by probability distributions over the equilibrium prices that would variy 
continuously with the vector of modified initial endowments. This assumption would allow 
enough flexibility in the choice of probabilities to make the distribution continuous and it 
should also succeed in restoring the existence of an intertemporal rational expectations 
equilibrium (with a random , but “rationally expected, choice of tomorrow’s spot 
equilibrium prices). Despite the fact that the construction put forward by Mas-Colell (1991) 
and generalised by Kajii and Gottardi (1999) cannot be directly transposed9 to the 2x2x2 
model, it suggests that, in the case of Figure 2, we can find a stochastic equilibrium of the 
type I have just described.10 We note that an equilibrium of this kind is a rational 
expectations equilibrium (coordination is maintained) though it ceases to be efficient! 
 
4.2 Should we insure against spot multiplicity? 
 
Let us admit that in the case of spot multiplicity, the independent Scarf agency chooses 
randomly. Let us call stochastic equilibrium or sunspot equilibrium the equilibrium that 
corresponds to such a choice. The noise introduced, which destroys the first best efficiency 
justifies the introduction of insurance. How does it perform? 
 Let us call ex ante insurance a system of income transfers that, conditional on the 
equilibrium choice, would occur at the same time as the equilibrium choice. This ex ante 
insurance,11 which, as we have already seen, is not in a position to solve the multiplicity 
problem, would in principle attenuate  the effects of a random choice of prices. It is, 
however, more reasonable to think that in this case, ex post insurance would be a better 
theoretical choice. The introduction of such an insurance mechanism would require us to 
complete our 2x2x2 model by introducing a third period: in this third period, after having 
undone all the previous trades that were contingent on the equilibrium prices, the spot 
markets would be reopened. We note that the securities that we have just introduced are 
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reminiscent of options. As the analyses of Chichilnisky, Dutta and Heal (1992) have 
shown, the ex post options considered here play the role of imperfect insurance vis-à-vis 
the choice of a coordinator à la Scarf.  
 
 
4.3 Multiplicity and redundant assets  
 
There is perhaps another solution to the problem of insuring against the hazards of the 
choice of equilibrium in the case of spot multiplicity. 
 Returning to the 2x2x2 model, we observe that the initial allocations that determine 
the problem of the computation of the equilibrium in the second period are not independent, 
for a given intertemporal equilibrium, of the securities actually present on the financial 
market. For example, Figure 3 shows security trades when the security assigns rights on 
good 2 in the subsequent period. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 : Visualisation of the exchange of securities, depending on whether they are 
labelled in good 1 (horizontal arrow) or in good 2 (vertical arrow). 
 
 As the figure shows, although the spot equilibrium remains the same, the excess 
demand functions change. This remark suggests that the choice of financial assets affects 
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our problem and that redundant assets, in other words the assets in excess of those required 
to make the market essentially complete, could play a favourable role in the coordination of 
expectations. Indeed, Mas-Colell (1991) has shown that the introduction of a redundant 
asset makes the stochastic equilibria disappear in a framework that is not too distant from 
the model we are considering here. His argument applies here and more generally to the n  
goods version of the two period model considered here. It shows that if the number of 
independent assets allowing for the forward exchange of independent baskets of goods is 
equal to the number of goods, then a stochastic equilibrium does not exist. Since the 
hypothesis on the assets thus introduced goes back to assuming that the market is complete 
in an Arrow-Debreu sense and not only essentially complete, the intuition of the result is, in 
a certain sense, immediate: the addition of Radner-type assets does not have any effect on 
the intertemporal Arrow-Debreu allocation. Despite this, the careful Mas-Colell (1991) 
reader will note that, setting aside the lack of realism of the assumption on the number of 
assets, the result does not fully satisfactorily resolve the coordination problem arising from 
spot multiplicity (when this is present). At the equilibrium he describes, the agents are 
indifferent between trading securities in the first period or engaging in further trades of 
goods and coordination, which assumes equilibrium of security trades today, must, in one 
way or another, have some  centralised aspect. 
 
5. Uniqueness, multiplicity, incompleteness. 
 
The stochastic equilibrium that we have just described and whose existence we have briefly 
discussed has the following characteristics: after the trades have taken place there are three 
spot equilibria and one of these is chosen randomly. We can see this, using the commonly 
accepted terminology, as a sunspot equilibrium. In this particular case though, the sunspot 
equilibrium is tied to spot multiplicity. Is this necessary? 
 
5.1 Sunspots and spot uniqueness 
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Let us imagine, for example in the 2.2.2 model, that there exists only one spot equilibrium 
in quite a large domain of initial allocations. Is the uniqueness of the spot equilibrium 
compatible with the existence of a stochastic sunspot equilibrium correlated to an extrinsic 
random variable Ss∈ ? The answer is clearly no in the two extreme cases: 
 
 No assets exist allowing insurance against sunspots. For example, with the single 
security on the numeraire postulated at the beginning of this paper for the 2.2.2 model, 
the uniqueness of the spot equilibrium makes any stochastic allocation impossible in the 
second period and therefore any intertemporal stochastic equilibrium impossible as 
well. 
 Enough assets ( Sf ) exist to be fully insured against sunspots. In this case the 
allocation is Pareto optimal and therefore, if the economy is convex, deterministic. It 
should moreover be noted that one consequence of the redundancy argument mentioned 
earlier, despite the limitations we highlighted, is that it is not necessary to have an 
infinite number of insurance markets in order to be fully insured against sunspots, even 
if the potential number of sunspots is infinite. Along similar lines, the argument put 
forward by Kajii (1999) shows that the addition of a sufficiently large number of ‘call’ 
options to a financial security can eliminate extrinsic uncertainty, whatever the number 
of sunspots considered. 
 
The answer to the question posed (stochastic equilibrium despite spot uniqueness) cannot 
therefore be positive unless the number of assets is intermediate, for example, if our 2x2x2 
model has 3=S  and two negotiable assets in the first period. The example provided by 
Hens (2000a) is set against this kind of framework. Although the example entails an error 
(Barnett and Fisher 2002), it can be modified in such a way as to save the conclusion (Hens 
2000b): when insurance markets against sunspots are incomplete, despite spot uniqueness, 
a stochastic intertemporal equilibrium can exist. 
 
5.2 Multiplicity, incomplete markets and sunspots 
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Our argument is set out in the context of the 2.2.2 model in which the financial market renders the 
economy essentially complete at least vis-à-vis intrinsic uncertainty. What happens when this is no 
longer the case? Without attempting to answer the question at a very general level, we can tackle 
the issue within the maintained framework of the 2x2x2 model by supposing that there is intrinsic 
uncertainty in the second period (applying to either preferences or endowments) and that it is 
associated to two signals. If the signals are not verifiable, then no contingent asset is viable and, for 
example, only the initial financial market is open. Figure 4 shows the equilibrium allocation with 
such an incomplete market. 
 
Figure 4 : Spot equilibrium, (second period), intrinsic, (and unverifiable) state of nature s 
 
 
In this case, the PPPE equilibria are no longer efficient in terms of first best Pareto 
efficiency. However, in the case of second period spot multiplicity, a further hurdle is 
added to the difficulty of coordinating equilibrium choices -the subject of the preceding 
paragraph. Paradoxically, this difficulty appears when extrinsic uncertainty (the one tied to 
sunspots etc.) is, as in the paragraph that follows, contractible and can therefore act as a 
support to a security of the following type: a numeraire unit if the sunspot is in that state. If 
the securities are traded in the first period and are realised before the second period spot 
equilibrium has been reached, then if the number of spot equilibria in the model without 
extrinsic uncertainty is p , the number of equilibria in the model with extrinsic uncertainty,  
and insurance against it, is 12 −p :  n other words,  there exist necessarily 1−p  stochastic 
equilibria. This is the result obtained by Guesnerie and Laffont (1988) in a context of 
n goods, which holds for the 2x2x2 model with intrinsic uncertainty referred to here. It 
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implies there that, in the absence of endowments in the first period, so that the non 
contingent security is not tradable in the absence of non-contingent securities, if there were 
initially  3 spot equilibria in each non insurable intrinsic state, (hence 9 Radner equilibria), 
the number of stochastic equilibria when all susnspot contingent securities are available is, 
in the case suggested by Figure 4, of 8 ! One must also understand that the just suggested 
increased intertemporal equilibrium multiplicity will not, at least in general, reduce the 
multiplicity of the spot equilibria contingent on the states of an extrinsic nature. In this case 
the coordination difficulties are exacerbated: in our example, the number of intertemporal 
equilibria goes to p-1, but in each case, it is plausible that the number of spot equilibria is 
equal to 3. Paradoxically, the new markets created to take the sunspots into account are 
responsible for this exacerbation of the difficulty. Their creation increases price volatility 
and is an additional source of inefficiency. 
The analysis put forward by Bowman and Faust (1997) is even more intriguing in a 
certain sense. In their analysis, in a (three period) model where we cannot insure against 
intrinsic uncertainty (a shock on preferences) but where there is spot uniqueness, the 
introduction of a ‘call option’ leads to the emergence of an Pareto optimal equilibrium,  a 
point is in line with the results of traditional analysis (Ross 1976). But the introduction also  
gives rise to new sunspot equilibria that can be ‘less good’ than the equilibrium without the 
option. What’s more, although the market is initially essentially complete, the addition of a 
redundant option, and hence one that can be priced using Black-Scholes type techniques, 
can introduce, in addition to the efficient equilibrium that remains attainable, sunspot 
equilibria.   
The conclusion of these exploratory thoughts is not crystal clear. Let us say that if 
the phenomenon of a sunspot stochastic equilibrium in finite horizon general equilibrium 
models is not the necessary consequence of spot multiplicity, this makes it more 
formidable. The multiplication and / or redundancy of assets has ambiguous effects on 
coordination.12 The subject deserves to be examined in greater depth, so that the results of 
Hens (2000b), Guesnerie and Laffont (1988), Bowman and Faust (1997) can be placed into 
a unified and improved framework. 
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6 Cognitive coordination processes 
 
We have seen how the problem of multiplicity in finite horizon general equilibrium models 
that could initially appear minor takes a more complex turn once we allow for spot 
equilibrium multiplicity, even when the intertemporal equilibrium is unique. By 
concentrating on this difficulty and associating it to the problem of coordination between 
agencies charged with computing the equilibrium in each period, we implicitly admitted 
that the only difficulty in the forecast of the second period price depended on the hazards of 
the choice of the Scarf agency and not on the uncertainty of the conditions in which it 
operated. In other words, in the 2x2x2 model, we assumed that the vector of modified 
initial endowments, which was the starting point of the analysis, was perfectly predictable. 
We now abandon this hypothesis and assume that, in line with the logic of what we called 
Hypothesis 4, individual agents have to forecast all the data  of the second period. This 
problem is clearly independent from the multiplicity problem, be it intertemporal or spot.13 
The analysis will therefore be carried out in relation to models with both intertemporal and 
spot uniqueness and which include learning. 
 
6.1 Learning the equilibrium: evolutionary and eductive points of view 
 
Standard evolutionary procedures (those of evolutionary learning) are based on the 
application of mechanical rules, that start from a limited understanding of the functioning 
of the system or from a limited rationality, and lead to a correction of expectations when 
these are found to be inaccurate. For example, in this case the agents would revise the 
second period price expectations that turned out to be wrong and the process would 
continue until convergence, for each repetition of the two period economy considered. The 
revision mechanisms studied are generally simple (e.g. adaptive rules) and such that their 
repeated application can allow agents to learn the equilibrium, in the sense that the only 
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resting state of the system that is compatible with the revision rule is the equilibrium state 
itself. There is a considerable number of works on evolutionary learning. 14 
 Work on eductive learning starts from a different idea, the iterated elimination of 
the strategies that are not best responses, a process that leads to the set of rationalisable 
solutions.15 Alternatively, this procedure can be seen as stemming from the model’s 
assumptions of common knowledge and individual rationality.16 I have suggested 
associating the success of a local eductive procedure, which, in my words, establishes the 
strong rationality of expectations, to the convergence of the elimination process triggered 
by an assumed common knowledge of a local restriction on the state of the system. 
Research of this kind affects both models where decisions taken independently today affect 
the state of the system tomorrow and infinite horizon models where the eductive 
expectation stability criterion is confronted with alternative criteria.17 A detailed review of 
this work is presented in Guesnerie (2002).  
 
6.2 Eductive learning in standard general equilibrium models: a brief 
introduction 
 
I would like to refer to some of the studies on the eductive stability of expectations in the 
general equilibrium model (a two period exchange economy) a little less briefly. In this 
model, the agents in the first period must ‘educe’ the second period equilibrium price 
before providing the necessary information to the agency charged with computing the first 
period equilibrium. However, assuming the second period equilibrium prices are unique for 
the sake of simplicity, these depend in a way on the ability of agents to calculate the wealth 
transfers (through saving between the first and second period) that are decided 
simultaneously by the agents. The collective eductive process affects both the savings 
forecast and the equilibrium price simultaneously. This occurs because in the 2x2x2 model 
with spot uniqueness on the point expectation of initial endowments modified by the 
financial market’s transactions (in Figure 1) the plausibility of the rational expectations 
hypothesis (in the sense of the aforementioned eductive stability criterion) increases with 
the insensitivity of tomorrow’s equilibrium price to the distribution of purchasing power or 
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the insensitivity of savings to the goods’ interest rates. Both these properties depend on the 
agents’ preferences in their intertemporal and static aspects (see Ghosal 2000, Guesnerie 
and Hens 1999). 
 The last two models I would like to refer to are situated within a ‘macroeconomic’ 
framework where firms   today make hiring decisions (Guesnerie 2001b). These decisions 
determine the volume of product brought to market, a volume that will be sold at the 
competitive price, given the total revenue distributed during production. It can be shown 
that the eductive stability of the Keynesian equilibrium (fixed salary) is favoured by a weak 
price elasticity of supply of the producers (which makes errors in the cross forecast of each 
agent’s price expectations less significant), a strong demand elasticity (which makes 
tomorrow’s price less uncertain) and a high value for the elementary  Keynesian multiplier 
(the inverse of the marginal propensity to consume), which gives a positive role to the 
strategic complementarities associated with the increased revenue and new job 
opportunities by reducing the strategic substitutabilities. Curiously enough the same factors 
favour the eductive stability of the flexible wage Walrasian equilibrium. Despite this, in 
this last case, the generalisation of the argument to an n  good model shows that the 
stabilising force of the Keynesian multiplier is reduced (Guesnerie 2001c). 
 
 
7 Conclusion. 
 
This brief review of contemporary thinking on expectations is both subjective and 
incomplete. It is subjective because it assigns a privileged place to the works I know best 
and therefore, among others, my own contributions and in particular those in sections 3.2 
and 5 which only incompletely touch  important subjects and considerable areas.  
It is incomplete because I have only summarily treated one of the least known 
chapters of theoretical developments, the one relating to spot equilibrium multiplicity in 
finite horizon models, in this case in two period models. This choice, even if we have often 
gone beyond the strict problems of spot equilibrium multiplicity, is clearly debateable, 
given that the degree of pertinence of the phenomenon of spot equilibrium multiplicity for 
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the understanding of economic phenomena is an open question: which stylised facts are or 
could be explained by spot equilibrium multiplicity? Even if Hildebrand’s work (1994) on 
the plausibility of the law of demand is an important exception, too few works allow us to 
approach this question with the seriousness it deserves in relation to the analyses referred to 
in this article. 
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Notes 
1 In the 2x2x2 model, an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium consists in 21, pp , two price vectors of 
nR  (good 1 of the first period being the numeraire whose price equals 1), an intertemporal 
consumption plan for each of the agents, ( )ii xx 21 , , i=1,2, such that: 
1. ( )ii xx 21,  is the solution of the following programme:  
Max ( )ii xxu 21,  
iiii ppxpxp 22112211 ωω +≤+  
 1. ∑∑ ∑∑ ≤≤ iiii xx 2211 , ωω  
2 In the 2x2x2 model, an EPPPE consists in two given price vectors, 21, pp , of 
nR  (good 1 
being in each period the numeraire whose price equals 1), an interest rate i, an 
intertemporal consumption plan for each of the agents, ( )ii xx 21 , , i=1,2, and positions iy , 
i=1,2, on the financial market such that: 
 1. ( )ii xx 21 ,  is the solution of the following programme: 
 Max ( )ii xxu 21 ,  
iii pyxp 1111 ω≤+  
( ) ii yipxp ++≤ 122122 ω  
1.  ∑ ∑∑ ∑ ≤≤ iiii xx 2211 , ωω  
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3 In an infinite horizon model with a finite number of participants (a fact that implies a 
certain number of them has an infinite life span) and under the hypothesis that they remain 
small, the identity of allocations also obtains (see Kehoe and Levine 1985). 
4 We could indeed see behind it  the ideal “Commissariat du Plan”  as set out by Massé 
(1971)  
5 Which we could, in the first instance, consider to be unique. 
6 Which in a certain sense affects the power of the transversality conditions. 
7 In the simple overlapping generations model, these two classes of solution are intimately 
related to each other, as shown by Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986): (binary) sunspot 
equilibria exist if and only if cycles of order 2 exist.  
8 See for example Balasko (1981). 
9 Mas-Collel’s argument requires three goods and therefore is valid in the 2x3x2 version of 
our model. 
10 However, it is not fully enlightening on the conditions under which variations of the 
probability distributions would make the existence of an equilibrium with a stochastic 
agency probable. 
11 Whose formal definition if not realisation, the reader will verify, is not trivial. 
12 A different argument, in a different model, is put forward by Guesnerie and Rochet 
(1992): in this case redundancy contributes to the destabilization of expectations. 
13 We reexamine the problem in a different way, that is more modest and more ambitious at 
the same time. It is more modest, because, considering the recurrent character of 
multiplicity, we look amongst all equilibria for those that are the most credible candidates 
from the point of view of expectation coordination. It is more ambitious because the criteria 
that we adopt can lead to the rejection of a model’s unique equilibrium. 
14 The majority of studies on learning do not take place  within a general equilibrium 
context, with the exception of those that fall within the framework of overlapping 
generations models. In this context, many studies have been made on evolutionary learning 
of the stationary state (de Canio 1979, Marcet and Sargent 1989a, 1989b), of cycles 
(Grandmont and Laroque 1986, Guesnerie-Woodford 1992), or of sunspot equilibria 
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(Woodford 1990, Desgranges and Negroni 2003). The interested reader can usefully 
consult the review and recent work of (Evans and Honkaphoja 1997, 2001). 
15 In the framework of a strategic complementarity case, this set has a simple structure and, 
if the equilibrium is unique, it is reduced to it (see Cooper and John 1989, Milgrom and 
Roberts 1990). 
16 See Bernheim (1984), Pearce (1984), Tan and Werlang (1988). 
17 See for example Evans and Guesnerie (2003), Gauthier (2003) on the restrictions, the 
support but also the reasons that the eductive viewpoint provides for  the choice of saddle 
point solutions. 
